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1 Introduction
As a consequence of the railway reforms in the nineteen nineties, the former state
monopolies in the industry are facing increasing competition in many European
countries. The proponents of the reforms argue that this development will not only
lead to decreasing subsidies, but also to a better service quality.1
However, this opinion is not undisputed. First, there are serious arguments that
cast doubt on the hope that the potential eﬃciency gains from liberalisation in the
railway industry are similar to those in other sectors, most notably telecommuni-
cations.2 Second, it is not obvious that the institutional details in the liberalized
railway industry have been chosen in such a fashion that potential eﬃciency gains
are realized.3 From a-priori considerations, it is impossible to come to a definite con-
clusion regarding the pros and cons of liberalization as such, let alone the particular
institutions chosen in the diﬀerent European countries.
The empirical evaluation of the railway reforms is still in its infancy. A small
number of contributions deals with the eﬃciency eﬀects of various reforms in an
international context on a highly aggregate level (Cantos et al. 1999, Friebel et
al. 2003). Our contribution concentrates on a concrete measure, namely the Ger-
man Regionalisierungsgesetz, a law that was passed in 1993.4 This measure gave
the responsibility for the procurement of regional passenger rail transport to the 16
federal states (Länder) which, in turn, delegated this task to newly founded agen-
cies. These agencies are now allowed to use competitive franchising to procure the
services. Importantly, however, they are not obliged to do so. On 20-25% of the
passenger railway lines a substantial part of local passenger services is now procured
in a (more or less) competitive fashion. On the remaining lines, all services are
still provided by the incumbent without any competition for the market. Typically,
1Unsurprisingly, a particularly optimistic perspective on the potential eﬃciency gains from
competition comes from a report commissioned by MehrBahnen, the umbrella organisation of
competitors of the state enterprise Deutsche Bahn (pspc 2004). The report estimates the potential
reduction in subsidies from relying on competitive mechanisms for procuring regional passenger
services at 18-38%, depending on the type of service.
2For instance, there is no reason to expect similar technological improvements as in the telecoms
sector, as the railroad technology is comparatively mature.
3For instance, there is no consensus as to the right extent of vertical separation. Also, it is not
obvious how access prices should best be regulated, for instance in view of the implied investment
incentives for network owners and operators. In the case of the British reform, both issues were
hotly debated (see, e.g. Bühler et al. 2004).
4Oﬃcially, the law is known as Gesetz zur Regionalisierung des öﬀentlichen Personen-
nahverkehrs. It was passed on December 27, 1993 as Article 4 of the Eisenbahnneuordnungsgesetz,
which contains most of the legal foundations for the German railway reform.
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the service provider in these cases is DB Regio, a subsidiary of Deutsche Bahn AG,
the succesor of the former state monopolist; in much rarer cases, some other com-
pany carries out the service without having obtained the franchise in a competitive
fashion.5
While DB Regio is still the dominant operator ten years after the reforms were
introduced, its competitors, the NE-operators,6 have expanded their market share
from 3% to about 10% (pspc 2004).7 Moreover, in cases where competitive bidding
is applied, the competitors are successful at least as often as DB Regio, suggesting
that in the medium term this operator’s dominance may well belong to the past.8
Nevertheless, the partial nature of the introduction of competition for the market
has often been criticized by competitors of DB Regio (e.g., pspc 2004). For our
empirical analysis, however, this state of aﬀairs is very helpful, as it allows a direct
comparison between the competitive segment of the market and the control group of
remaining railway lines. Our analysis attempts to clarify whether the development
of service quality in the competitive segment has been more favorable than in the
non-competitive segment, where service quality is defined as the frequency of service
on the railway line under consideration.9
The paper is part of a larger project that deals with the eﬀect of competition
for the market for the entire German regional passenger railway system. Here,
we consider preliminary evidence for the state of Baden-Württemberg, one of the
largest German states, where the fraction of railway lines that have been exposed
to competition is clearly above average. We have collected the data for most other
German states as well, and we are in the process of evaluating the data.
Our data strongly suggest that there is a competition eﬀect : The quality of
service on those lines that were subjected to competition developed more favorably
than on those that were not. A natural interpretation of this result is that agencies
know they can ask more from railroad operators when there is competition than
when there is not. This eﬀect is robust to the introduction of control variables
5As will be laid out in Section 2, a considerable number of small operators were already active
before the railway reform.
6“NE” refers to “nicht-bundeseigen”, that is, not belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany.
7This market share is expressed in terms of the services supplied (train kilometers). In terms
of patronage, the competitors’ market share is around 6%.
8It should be noted, however, that there is a recent tendency for agencies to write long-time
contracts with DB Regio which put limits on the extent to which competitive bidding will be used
in the future. For instance, in Baden-Württemberg such a contract was signed in 2003 (Stuttgarter
Nachrichten 2003).
9See Section 3 for a discussion of this definition.
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which could have an independent eﬀect on the development of service quality, for
instance, the remoteness of the line or the population of the communities cerved.
However, we also show that the eﬀects of competition depends highly on the
characteristics of the railway lines. For instance, the potential seems much greater
for remote lines than for lines in agglomerations, and much smaller for electrified
lines than for those served by diesel trains.
There also appears to be some evidence for ownership eﬀects. On the one hand,
NE-operated non-competitive lines tend to grow more rapidly than the correspond-
ing lines operated by DB Regio. On the other hand, while the additional eﬀect of
competition is strong and significant, for DB Regio, it is mixed for the NE-operators.
For the largest NE-operator, the Albtalbahn-Verkehrsgesellschaft (AVG) near Karl-
sruhe, the eﬀect of competition is even stronger, whereas the remaining NE-operators
do not develop much diﬀerently than their non-competitive counterparts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we shall sketch
some institutional background and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the
methods and the data set. In Section 4, we present our econometric results. .
Section 5 concludes and describes the next steps of the investigation.
2 Background and Hypotheses
2.1 Institutional Background
As in most other European countries, the railways in Germany were essentially run
by state monopolies until the early nineteen nineties. In West Germany, Deutsche
Bundesbahn owned most of the infrastructure and, at the same time, was the dom-
inant operator for passenger and freight services. In addition, there was a con-
siderable number of minor railroad companies (NE-Bahnen) which were typically
also vertically integrated and carried out freight and/or passenger transportation
on small networks.10 In East Germany, Deutsche Reichsbahn was the integrated
operator of the railway system.
Major reforms of the railway system were introduced in Germany in the nineteen
nineties. These reforms were induced by the EU-directive 91/440, but there was also
some internal pressure to introduce changes to the system. First, after reunification,
10“NE-Bahn” stands for Nichtbundeseigene Eisenbahn, that is, a railway company that is not
owned by the state of Germany. The term contains both privately owned firms and firms that
belong to the public sector (e.g., firms that are owned by local authorities).
4
there was the obvious issue of integrating the East and West German railways.
Second, the cumulated debt of the two state railways was immense, amounting to
DM 67 Mrd. in 1993 (Greﬀrath and Lingenthal 1994).
On January 1, 1994, the railway reform became eﬀective. Apart from creating
Deutsche Bahn AG as a successor of Deutsche Bundesbahn and Deutsche Reichs-
bahn, the reform had several elements that were familiar from other countries. First,
though Deutsche Bahn AG is generally regarded as a vertically integrated com-
pany, distinct sub-organisations were introduced at the upstream level (DB Netz for
the network and DB Station & Service for the stations) and the downstream level
(DB Regio for regional passenger transportation, DB Reise und Touristik for long-
distance passenger services and DB Cargo for freight). Thus, at least a move into
the direction of vertical separation was made.11 Second, some degree of competition
was introduced. Infrastructure owners, in particular DB Netz, are required to allow
freight operators and long-distance passenger operators access onto their network.12
With respect to local passenger services, an entirely diﬀerent avenue was pursued.
Essentially, the reforms led to the introduction of competition for the market.
More specifically, as a consequence of the railway reform, the Länder have
created agencies whose task it is to procure local passenger services. In Baden-
Württemberg, the most important agency is the Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Baden-
Württemberg (NVBW); in addition, the Verkehrsverbund Rhein-Neckar (VRN) and
the Verkehrs- und Tarifverbund Raum Stuttgart (VVS) are in charge of the services
in the agglomerations of Heidelberg/Mannheim and Stuttgart, respectively. In prin-
ciple, the agencies are free to use competitive bidding to allocate franchises for the
local monopoly on a particular line. The extent to which this possibility is used
varies considerably across agencies. Moreover, individual agencies like NVBW and
VRN use diﬀerent mechanisms to procure services on diﬀerent lines within their
sphere of influence. The two polar cases are most important. At one extreme, the
agencies can negotiate directly with the incumbent supplier, without contacting any
potential competitors. At the other extreme, they can resort to open competitive
bidding for the market. In the simplest type of bidding procedure, the agency spec-
ifies detailed requirements about the level of service quality that it expects. The
specifications include the frequency of service, the rolling stock, the prices charged
11In 1999, this separation was taken one step further. Deutsche Bahn AG is now a holding
company, consisting of five corporations.
12In practice, access is negligible for long-distance passenger trains, but substantial for freight
trains.
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to customers, etc.13 The contractors’ bids are the subsidy levels required to carry
out the expected services.14 The successful bidder is paid his bid and obtains the
franchise for a period of typically 5-10 years. He then becomes the residual claimant
for the operating profits of the line.15
Diﬀerences in contractors’ bids reflect both diﬀerences in their relative eﬃciencies
and in the quality of the estimations of the value of the franchise, which is driven
for instance by the expected number of passengers. Thus, the auction has a private-
value component as well as a common-value component. For this reason, it is not
necessarily clear that the successful bid will come from the most eﬃcient firm. The
winner may simply have overestimated the potential gains from the market. To
my knowledge, there is only one obvious case of competitive bidding in the German
railway market where this kind of “winner’s curse” phenomenon played an important
role: The winner of an auction for the line Hamburg-Flensburg in Schleswig-Holstein
was the newly founded FlexVerkehrs AG that went bankrupt within a year after
taking up the service in 2002 (derFahrgast 2003).
As a result of the introduction of competition for the market, the market share of
DB Regio’s competitors has grown substantially. The pool of competitors consists
of several types of firms. First, the above-mentioned pre-reform NE-operators play
an important role. These firms typically still own their old infrastructure, but they
often have expanded their operations onto the network of Deutsche Bahn where
they are exclusively responsible for the provision of downstream services.16 Second,
a substantial number of entirely new companies have been formed. Third, some rail-
13In Germany, regional public transport organisations (Verkehrsverbünde) coordinate timetables,
prices etc. on a substantial part of the network. In some cases, but my no means always, these
organisations are identical with the agencies that procure services; often they are entirely separate
institutions. Either way, the freedom of railway operators to set prices is limited by the existence
of the public transport organisations.
14In typical textbook treatments of competition for the market (Viscusi et al. 2000), the proce-
dure is slightly diﬀerent. Contractors do not bid the required subsidy. Instead, they bid the price
they want to charge to consumers and the lowest bid wins (Demsetz 1968).
15There are also cases where the specifications of the auction are less detailed, leaving some
scope for the contractors to compete in other dimensions than the required subsidies. As the exact
weighting of the diﬀerent dimensions is typically left unspecified, the allocation mechanism is closer
to a “beauty contest” than to multi-dimensional auction in the sense of Che (1993) and Branco
(1997).
16In Baden-Württemberg, the main pre-reform operators were Südwestdeutsche Eisenbah-
ngesellschaft (SWEG), Württembergische Eisenbahngesellschaft (WEG), Hohenzollerische Lan-
deseisenbahn (HzL), Albtalbahn-Verkehrsgesellschaft (AVG) and Oberrheinische Eisenbahnge-
sellschaft (OEG). SWEG, HzL and AVG have expanded their operations onto the Deutsche Bahn
network, partly in joint ventures. OEG still concentrates on its old network; WEG has been taken
over by Connex.
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way operators are joint ventures between other companies, in some cases including
DB Regio.17 Finally, foreign firms have entered the market. Typically, they have
taken over independent local operators; however, there are also examples of entry
on lines that were previously operated by DB Regio.18
2.2 Hypotheses
In the following, we shall show empirically that the introduction of competition has
had a positive eﬀect on a suitable measure of service quality. Though we shall be
more specific in the empirical analysis, it is useful for the moment to think of service
quality in a very broad way, including the frequency of service, reliability, comfort
and, in addition, ticket prices, which are often part of the arrangement between
agencies and contractors.
When there are direct negotiations with the incumbent supplier, there is usu-
ally no immediate threat for the supplier that asking for high subsidies will mean
losing the contract. Thus, the incumbent can be expected to have some bargaining
power vis à vis the agency. Therefore, compared with the case of competitive bid-
ding, we should expect the required subsidies for each level of service quality to be
higher. This not only reflects the competitive-pressure eﬀect that all firms, whether
incumbents or not, are forced to take the existence of competitors into account. In
addition, there may be an eﬃciency eﬀect : Usually, competitive bidding helps to
find the most eﬃcient bidder which should also lower bids.19
Figure 1 shows how the introduction of competition improves the position of
the agency. Line d contains all feasible combinations of subsidies and quality for
an agent facing a monopolist; line w is the analogous line for an agent that has
introduced competition. Both lines are increasing, as higher quality will require
higher subsidies. However, line w lies below line d to capture the hypothesis that
competition reduces the required subsidies.20
17In Baden-Württemberg, there are no examples of entirely new firms in the market. However,
for instance, the Breisgau S-Bahn was founded jointly by SWEG and the Freiburger Verkehrs AG,
the municipal transportation firm in Freiburg.
18An example of the former case is Connex, a multinational company based in France; an example
of the latter case is the entry of Swiss firms on lines near the border: the state railway SBB near
Basel and its subsidiary Eurothurbo near Lake Constance.
19However, as procurement auctions typically have private and common value components, rel-
atively ineﬃcient firms may win the bid when the uncertainty about the common value is large
(see, e.g., Goeree and Oﬀerman 2003 for a more thorough analysis).
20The linearity of the lines d and w is immaterial for the argument.
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Figure 1: Feasible subsidy/quality-bundles
In principle, there are three distinct possibilities for the agency to reap the
harvest of competition. Relative to the Status Quo (SQ), the agency could obtain:
(i) higher quality, lower subsidies (Point A)
(ii) lower quality, much lower subsidies (Point B)
(iii) much higher quality, higher subsidies (Point C)
Without further assumptions about the agency’s objective, it is not clear whether
it opts for an improvement of the quality of supply after the introduction of compe-
tition, that is, whether one of the cases A or C will obtain.
Clearly, however, the agency possesses the option to improve quality without
necessarily having to resort to higher subsidies. Whether it actually makes use of
this option is precisely the question that this paper attempts to solve.21
Thus, we formulate the main hypothesis of this paper:
Hypothesis 1 Competition increases service quality.
This hypothesis does not necessarily presuppose that the competitors are more
eﬃcient than the incumbent. In principle, competitive pressure alone could force
DB Regio to improve its oﬀer so that it wins the bid.
21As we shall spell out below, there are limits to our approach which result from the fact that
we only have detailed quality data rather than subsidy data.
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Nevertheless one might ask whether it is important for quality what kind of
operators provide the service. For instance, one might expect that private firms are
more eﬃcient than DB Regio, the successor of the former state monopolist Deutsche
Bundesbahn. Modifying the argument described above, an agency that faces an NE-
operator might ask for higher quality than when he faces DB Regio. The following
hypothesis is clearly distinct from the first one:
Hypothesis 2 Other things equal, firms that are not state-owned supply higher
quality.
Thus our investigation of the two hypotheses can also be regarded as an at-
tempt to contribute to the clarification of the open question whether competition or
privatisation is decisive for quality improvements in the public sector (Vickers and
Yarrow 1988, ch. 1).
3 Data and Methods
To test our hypotheses, we first require a measure of service quality. Ideally, such
a measure should aggregate all relevant aspects of quality, that is, the frequency
of service, safety, comfort and prices. A good candidate for such a measure would
be the number of passenger kilometers traveled on a line. This measure reflects
the conceived service quality from the perspective of the passengers. Unfortunately,
however, we only have rudimentary data on passenger kilometers, so that we used
a less satisfactory measure, namely the frequency of service. We measure this fre-
quency as the ratio between train kilometers per year (tkm) and the length of a
line (lkm).22 The frequency of service is an important aspect of service quality, but
obviously not the only one.
To identify competition eﬀects, we use a “Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence“- approach.23
Essentially, we compare the evolution of the frequency of service in the group of
competitive lines and the control group. We first introduce a definition for a com-
petitively served line. To understand this definition, it is important to note that
agencies do not necessarily procure all services on one line in the same fashion. For
instance, in some cases, the agencies use competitive bidding for higher-level services
22Thus, the frequency of service corresponds to the average number of trains per year on each
kilometer of tracks.
23See Meyer (1995) and Wooldridge (2002) for introductory material on the subject.
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(Regionalexpress), but procure lower level services on the same level directly from
the monopolist.
Definition 1 A line is served competitively if, for at least 20% of the train kilo-
meters that were provided on these lines in the year 2003/2004, one of the following
conditions holds:24
(i) The services were procured using open competitive bidding.
(ii) The services were procured on the basis of oﬀers from at least two firms that
were approached directly by the agency.
(iii) Apart from the incumbent, at least one firm approached the agency directly by
oﬀering a contract without having been asked to do so.
(iv) For reasons other than those given under (i)-(iii), the services were carried out
by another firm than the former incumbent DB Regio.
Case (i) is the most important in quantitative terms. The largest auction in
Germany to date was carried out by VRN. DB Regio cast the successful bid for the
S-Bahn Rhein-Neckar, a new metro system in the Heidelberg-Mannheim agglomer-
ation, amounting to approximately 6 Mio. tkm per year (Die Welt 2001). Other
major cases of competitive bidding in Baden-Württemberg included metro lines near
Freiburg, Karlsruhe and Oﬀenburg and the Ringzug, involving 1.258 Mio. tkm/year
in the eastern part of the Black Forest (Hohenzollerische Landesbahn 2001).
Case (ii) is quite common in general, but not in Baden-Württemberg.25
Case (iii) is rare in general, but it happened in Baden-Württemberg on one
occassion: Starting from 2003, the lines Basel SBB — Zell im Wiesental and Weil am
Rhein — Stetten were initially supposed to be served by the incumbent DB Regio
jointly with SBB, the Swiss state railway company. Then SWEG submitted an
unsolicited bid for both lines to which SBB reacted by submitting a bid without DB
Regio (Wirtschafts- und Sozialdepartement Basel-Stadt 2002).
We included category (iv) because it appears plausible that a firm that takes
over the duty of operating a line instead of DB Regio believes it can carry out
the service more eﬃciently than the incumbent. A typical example is the line
Schorndorf-Rudersberg near Stuttgart. In 1996, this line was “sold” for DM 1.-
24The 20% cut-oﬀ value is somewhat arbitrary; as, on most lines, the following conditions (i)-
(iv) hold either for a very small number of services or for a large number of services, the results
are likely to be robust to the exact choice of the cut-oﬀ level.
25For instance, in nearby Bavaria, the agency Bayerische Eisenbahngesellschaft asked five op-
erators directly to submit bids for about 1 Mio tkm on the line Munich-Oberstdorf (Bayerisches
Staatsministerium 2003).
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from the infrastructure operator DB Netz to the Württembergische Eisenbahnge-
sellschaft (WEG) which now belongs to the Connex group. The new infrastructure
owner also carries out the services on this line.26
Finally, we should point out that the group of competitive lines was not exclu-
sively served by competitors of DB Regio in the year 2004. When the incumbent DB
Regio won the bid, the line was obviously also included in the competitive category.
We first start with a simple descriptive approach to the problem. To identify
the eﬀect of competition, we compare the diﬀerence between the distribution of the
frequency of service on the competitive lines in 2004 and 1994 with the corresponding
frequencies for the control group. Essentially, we speak of a positive competition
eﬀect when the growth in the frequency of service is larger in the competitive group
than in the control group. Underlying this approach is the assumption that, without
the introduction of competition, there would have been no systematic diﬀerence
between the evolution of lines in the competitive group and those in the control
group. However, the approach does not require the initial distribution of frequencies
in the two groups to be similar.
For the simplest version of our investigation, we require the following information:
(1) A division of the passenger railway network in Baden-Württemberg into dis-
joint lines.
(2) The length of each line.
(3) The total train kilometers for each line in the years 1993/94 and 2003/04.27
(4) For each line, information on whether it belongs to the competitive group or
to the control group.
Items (1)-(3) were calculated from DB timetables, which involved substantial
eﬀort. We included those lines that were predominantly in the influence sphere of
the agencies NVBWand VRN. The division of the network into lines follows the 2004
timetable. Some adjustments were necessary, however, to avoid double-counting of
trains. Lines that were closed down between 1994 and 2004 were not included.
26In this example and several related cases, the new operator is vertically integrated, which is
typically not the case in the other examples. There, the infrastructure is owned by DB Netz,
whereas the services are provided by other firms (except when DB Regio is the successful bidder).
27The train categories that were included were S-Bahn, Regionalexpress and Regionalzug in
2004. In 1994, the respective categories were S-Bahn, Regionalschnellbahn, City-Bahn, Eilzug and
Nahverkehrszug.
11
Table 1 summarizes the data. There are 71 lines, 24 of which belong to the com-
petitive category. In terms of length, 37% of the network are served competitively.28
Number Percentage of Lines Line-Kilometers
Percentage of 
Line-Kilometers
Without competition 47 66 2395 63
With competition 24 34 1396 37
Total 71 100 3791 100
Table 1: Local Passenger Lines in Baden-Württemberg
Next, we consider the evolution of frequencies netween 1994 and 2004. We
observe:
1. a 30% increase in total transportation
2. a much stronger increase in the competitive group (49% vs. 20% in the control
group);
3. an increase in the number of lines operated at least partly by competitors of
DB Regio from 17 to 37;29
4. an increase in the total services of competitors of DB Regio by 270%.
28Recall from our definition of a competitive line that on lines that are served competitively, not
all the services are necessarily procured in a competitive fashion.
29It might seem contradictory that 37 lines were partly operated by competitors of DB Regio in
2004, whereas Table 1 only indicates 24 lines as being competitive. Note, however, that of the 37
lines just mentioned, 17 were already run by NE-operators in 1994 which have not been challenged
by competition since then. Thus, there are only 20 NE lines in the competitive category, the
remaining 4 lines in this group are run by DB Regio.
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1994 2004 %-change
Total tkm (/1000) 55'538.832 72'240.916 30%
tkm on lines without competition (/1000) 36'049.874 43'264.548 20%
tkm on lines with competition (/1000) 19'488.958 28'976.368 49%
% tkm with competition 35% 40% 14%
number of NE-lines 17 37 118%
fraction of NE-lines 24% 52% 118%
lkm on which NE-operators are active (/1000) 6'005.119 22'245.015 270%
% of lkm on which NE-operators are active 11% 31% 181%
number of AVG lines 3 11 267%
tkm supplied by AVG (/1000) 3'838.988 14'496.615 278%
Notes: NE refers to all operators except Deutsche Bahn (DB). AVG is a NE operator.
Table 2: The Evolution of the Market (Overview)
The aggregate results in Table 2 suggest an increasing importance of competitive
procurement mechanisms. It is unclear, however, whether this eﬀect merely reflects
that a growing number of lines have been exposed to competition or whether the
lines that have been subjected to competition have actually grown faster than others.
4 Results
We now present our main observations about the evolution of the frequency of
service. Before describing the estimation results, we present our results using simple
tables and figures.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
First, we describe the evolution of total transportation.
Result 1 In the period under consideration, the frequency of service in Baden-
Württemberg has increased substantially.
Table 3 compares the main indicators of the distribution of the frequency of
service for 1994 and 2004. The table shows a clear increase in the various percentiles
and the mean.
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Figure 2: The Overall Change in the Frequency of Service
1994 2004
10th percentile 6.227 9.187
Median 12.465 16.989
90th percentile 25.463 38.862
mean 14.496 20.392
standard deviation 9.802 13.045
Number of lines 71 71
Table 3: Frequency of Service (Service quality)
Figure 2 confirms this result. It shows that the density function for the frequency
of service has moved to the right between 1994 and 2004.30
Obviously, this shift of the density of the frequency of service only reflects an
expansive policy; in itself, it says nothing about an eﬀect of competition. Figures 3
and 4 are more helpful in this respect.
30Here and in the following, the graphs were obtained using Epanechnikov kernel density esti-
mators (with bandwidth h = 0.9bσn−1.5, where bσ = minnS, IQR1349o, S is the standard deviation and
IQR the interquartile range).
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Figure 3: The Frequency of Service on Competitive and Non-Competitive Lines
(2004)
Figure 3 compares the estimated densities of the frequency of services for the
competitive group and the control group in 2004. The figure suggests the following
result.
Result 2 The frequency of services in the competitive group was higher than in the
control group in 2004.
The result corresponds to the observation that the density for the competitive
group lies further to the right than for the control group. Obviously, this observation
does not necessarily imply a competition eﬀect in itself. It is conceivable that it
merely reflects a selection eﬀect, namely that more attractive lines are exposed to
competition more often than less attractive lines. In the concrete example, this
natural suspicion turns out to be unjustified, however. On the one hand, on a
considerable fraction of lines in the competitive group the frequency of service in
1994 was already substantial, for instance on those lines that were subjected to the
competitive bidding for the Rhein-Neckar metro system or on most of the lines that
were taken over by the Albtalbahn-Verkehrsgesellschaft (AVG) in the Karlsruhe area.
On the other hand, many lines in the competitive group had a very low frequency
of service in 1994. The most spectacular example is the line from Schorndorf to
Rudersberg, on which DB Regio oﬀered only 4607 tkm/lkm in 1994, while Connex
oﬀered 15.558 tkm/lkm in 2004.
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Figure 4: The Frequency of Service on Competitive and Non-Competitive Lines
(1994)
Figure 4, which displays the frequencies of service for 1994 and 2004 shows that,
contrary to the year 2004, there were hardly any diﬀerences between the two groups.
Thus, the diﬀerence in frequencies of service in the year 2004 cannot be the pure
selection eﬀect that high-frequency lines are systematically exposed to competition
more often than others.
Result 3 In 1994, the frequency of services in the competitive group was hardly
larger than in the control group.
The next observation is an immediate corollary of the last two results.
Result 4 On lines that were exposed to competition between 1994 and 2004, the
frequency of services grew more strongly than in the control group.
As argued earlier, we interpret this as a competition eﬀect. When faced with
a set of potential contractors rather than with a monopolist, agencies can ask for
better service quality without necessarily having to pay high subsidies.
Several caveats concerning this interpretation are in order. First, from a the-
oretical point of view, one might ask why agencies do not apply the competitive
mechanism more often if it is so successful. One explanation might be that there is
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value to experimentation with a relatively unfamiliar allocation mechanism.31 Sec-
ond, it is worth bearing in mind that our analysis lacks subsidy data. Thus, we
cannot provide evidence for greater “value for money” in the procurement of rail-
road services. For instance, if for some reasons agencies associate service quality
with competition, they might simultaneously opt for competitive procurement and
heavy subsidies on lines that they want to expand, whereas they procure from the
incumbent on lines where they want to keep low service levels, which makes low
subsidies possible.
5 Econometric Analysis
In the following, we shall investigate whether the competition eﬀect suggested by
Result 4 survives under closer scrutiny. We shall first analyze more carefully whether
the lines subjected to competition are diﬀerent from the lines in the control group.
We shall then use these insights to carry out an econometric analysis of the determi-
nants of the change in service quality. Finally, we consider the eﬀects of ownership.
5.1 Selection of Competitive Lines
Observers of the German railway industry frequently complain that the lines that
are procured competitively tend to be “lemons”, that is, unattractive lines with
low service quality and low growth prospects. Our descriptive analysis in the last
section suggests that this is not true for the special case of Baden-Württemberg.
Nevertheless, we now analyze more carefully whether the lines in the treatment
group are indeed systematically diﬀerent from those in the control group.
Most of our explanatory variables relate to the attractiveness of the lines which
is mostly determined by geography. Specifically, we consider the geographic distance
to the nearest city with at most 100,000 inhabitants as a measure of remoteness.
Further, we include the size of both the biggest and the second-biggest city in 1994.
Next, to deal directly with the idea that there might be a systematic trend diﬀerence
between lines in the competition group and the remaining lines, we consider the
population growth between 1994 and 2004 in the two major cities. In addition,
we include a dummy variable to check whether a line is electrified or not. The
prime motivation for doing so is that electrified lines are likely to be more attractive
31Alternatively, one could cook up political-economy stories about regulatory capture of the
agencies by the former state monopolist.
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than lines that are not. Also, one might imagine that agencies are more reluctant
to subject electric lines to competition because one would imagine that successful
bidding by entrants is less likely on these lines.
Table 4 gives simple descriptive statistics. The results support our prior that
there is little reason to believe that lines with competition are systematically less
attractive than lines without competition. If anything, the evidence suggests the
opposite conclusion. First, though this diﬀerence is not quite significant, lines that
are more remote are less likely to be subjected to competition. Second, concerning
the population variables, there is barely any diﬀerence in the size of the largest
community and the population growth in the second-largest community; and even
though the population in the second-largest community and growth in the largest
community are higher in the competition group; this diﬀerence is not significant.
Third, most importantly, a much greater percentage of the lines in the competition
group is electrified (70.8% in the treatment group as opposed to 40.4% in the control
group), and the diﬀerence is highly significant.
A probit analysis reported in Table A1 in the Appendix gives a similar picture,
except that, apart from the electrification dummy, there are now two more variables
that are significant, at least at the 10%-level. On the one hand, the negative coef-
ficient of the remoteness variable supports the idea that attractive lines are more
likely to be procured competitively; on the other hand, the negative coeﬃcient on
the variable representing population in the second-largest community suggests the
opposite.
We should hasten to add that the picture presented here is likely to be specific to
Baden-Württemberg, where in essentially all of the major cities a substantial part
of the “S-Bahn” (Metro) traﬃc is procured competitively. This is highly unusual
in the rest of Germany, where there seems to be some evidence for the “lemons”-
hypothesis.
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With 
competition
Without 
competition
Difference
(abs z-Value)
Distance to nearest city (km) 8.750 18.574 -9.824
(1.57)
Population in community 1 (1994; 1000) 179.217 177.888 1.328
(0.03)
Population in community 2 (1994; 1000) 42.568 54.906 -12.339
(0.81)
Population growth in community 1 (%) 2.231 3.264 -1.033
(0.95)
Population growth in community 2 (%) 3.228 3.040 0.188
(0.18)
Electricity 0.708 0.404 0.304***
(2.50)
Length (km) 58.167 50.957 7.209
(0.67)
Lines 24 47
Notes:
Table 4: Characteristics of Lines by Competition Status in 2004
Community 1 is the largest community, and community 2 is the 
second largest community along the railway line.
The results in Table 5 extend the point just made. They allow us to understand
what the explanatory variables just discussed have to say about diﬀerences in ex-
ante service quality. The first column in the table reflects our earlier observation
that lines with competition have slightly higher ex-ante service quality than lines
without competition. The second column introduces further independent variables.
These variables do a very good job at explaining the ex-ante service quality. First,
the two significant coeﬃcients suggest that electrified lines and lines that are closer
to big cities tend to have higher service quality. Second, though the population-
related variables are not significant individually, they clearly are jointly significant
in a plausible sense: The greater the population of each of the two biggest cities
on the line, the higher the ex-ante service quality. Also, the role of the interaction
term between population in community 1 and the length of the line is interesting.
Though the coeﬃcient is not quite significant, it suggests that the influence of the
population in the largest community on service quality is much smaller when the
line is longer. This clearly corresponds to intuition: A line that connects the largest
city in the country, Stuttgart, with some remote part of the Black Forest should be
expected to be served less than a line that lies almost entirely in the agglomeration.
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With competition 2.439 0.420
(0.98) (0.13)
Distance to nearest city (km) - -0.066
(2.09)**
Population in community 1 (1994; 1000 inhabitants) - 0.018
(1.27)
Population in community 2 (1994; 1000 inhabitants) - 0.038
(1.33)
Pop. in comm. 1 * length (/100) -  -0.023
(1.61)
Electricity - 5.389
(1.79)*
Length (km) - 0.013
(0.50)
Constant 13.672 9.426
(9.69)*** (4.51)***
F-test, pop. in comm. 1 and 2 - 2.93*
Observations 71 71
R-squared 0.01 0.34
Notes:
Table 5: Explaining ex ante differences in Service quality
Dependent variable: Service quality in 1994
Absolute z-Value in parenthese (based on robust Huber-White standard 
errors). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Service quality is train kilometers per line kilometers.
Importantly, once we have controlled for all the influences just mentioned, the ex-
ante diﬀerence in service quality between the two groups vanishes almost completely,
with the relevant coeﬃcient dropping from 2.439 to 0.420. This means that the ex-
ante diﬀerences in service quality are due to variables that we can actually measure.
This suggests that the measured line characteristics are also useful in controlling for
diﬀerences in service growth that are not due to competition, provided that lines
with a similar level of service also experience similar growth between 1994 and 2004.
5.2 Competition Eﬀects
We now use the control variables just introduced to explain the diﬀerences in the
changes in service quality better. Table 6 contains the results. The first column
essentially restates our earlier observation suggesting the existence of a positive
competition eﬀect. The remaining columns show the eﬀects of introducing control
variables.
Consider the second column. Most importantly, lines with high initial popu-
lation in the largest community experience higher growth, and this eﬀect is more
pronounced for shorter lines. The remaining coeﬃcients are insignificant. By adding
two variables relating to the population growth in the biggest and second-biggest
city, the model reflected in Column 3 deals with the conjecture that changes in the
service quality demanded by the agencies may reflect actual and expected popula-
tion changes. Though indeed service quality seems to grow slightly more rapidly on
the lines in the competition group, the eﬀect is both insignificant and negligible in
size.
20
As the first row of Table 6 clearly shows, both of the extended models suggest
that the competition eﬀect is remarkably robust, with the size and significance of
the competition coeﬃcent being almost unchanged in the three diﬀerent models.
With competition 4.797 4.533 4.550
(2.054)** (2.28)** (2.25)**
Distance to nearest city (km) - 0.029 0.030
(1.02) (1.06)
Population in community 1 (1994; 1000 inhabitants) - 0.028 0.028
(1.93)* (1.90)*
Population in community 2 (1994; 1000 inhabitants) - -0.003 -0.001
(0.16) (0.05)
Pop. in comm. 1 * length (/100) -  -0.024 -0.025
(1.75)* (1.72)*
Electricity - 1.689 1.769
(0.94) (1.03)
Length (km) - -0.018 -0.017
(0.84) (0.73)
Population growth in community 1 - - 0.322
(0.18)
Population growth in community 2 - - 0.122
(0.82)
Constant 4.275 2.151 1.396
(4.51)*** (1.29) (0.66)
F-test, pop. in comm. 1 and 2 - 1.99 1.95
Observations 71 71 71
R-squared 0.09 0.29 0.29
Notes:
Table 6: The effect of competition on Service quality
Dependent variable: Change in Service quality 1994 to 2004
Absolute z-Value in parenthese (based on robust Huber-White standard errors). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Service 
quality is train kilometers per line kilometers.
5.3 Ownership Eﬀects
The results sketched so far suggest a positive competition eﬀect. However, we have
not yet shown whether this eﬀect is driven by ownership or by competitive pressure.
As a considerable number of the lines in the competitive group are operated by
DB Regio, it is not clear whether a change of ownership from DB Regio to an
NE-operator is necessary for an improvement in service quality. Interestingly, the
data allow discussing this issue in detail. Out of the 24 lines subject to competitive
bidding, 6 lines were won by DB Regio, 6 lines were won by AVG — the largest NE-
operator in Baden-Württemberg — and the remaining 12 lines were won by smaller
NE-operators.32
32Given the small size of our sample and specifically the fact that there are only 24 members
of the competition group, it is impossible to draw far-reaching conclusions about the relation
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Table 7 is a first step towards disentangling the eﬀects of competition and own-
ership. The left-hand column is identical with the last column in Table 6, that is,
there are no controls for ownership. The right-hand column controls for ownership.
The reference case is a line operated by DB Regio in 2004. In addition, we use two
dummies to distinguish between two types of NE lines, those operated by AVG, the
Albtal-Verkehrsgesellschaft operating in the Karlsruhe area, and the remaining NE
lines. The motivation for doing so is that the AVG is a particularly large operator,
the expansion of which was pushed by local policy. Our results show that is impor-
tant two take ownership into account. First, the positive signs of the pure ownership
dummies (AVG and NE, not AVG) suggest that, in the absence of competition, both
types of lines saw stronger growth than the DB Regio lines; note, however, that nei-
ther eﬀect is significant. Second, the interaction terms show that competition eﬀects
are quite heterogeneous. For the baseline case of a DB Regio line the eﬀect is sig-
nificant at the 5%-level and quite substantial. For lines operated by AVG, the eﬀect
of competition is still much stronger (though the diﬀerence is not quite significant).
For the remaining NE-operators, there is essentially no competition eﬀect.33
between ownership and performance. However, the following observations suggest why such an
analysis might be instructive at the national level.
33The positive overall competition eﬀect of 5.139 and the negative eﬀect of -6.109 captured in
the interaction term “With competition*NE, excl. AVG” essentially cancel out.
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W i t h  c o m p e t i t i o n 4 . 5 5 0 5 . 1 3 9
( 2 . 2 5 ) * * ( 2 . 0 8 ) * *
W i t h  c o m p e t i t i o n  *  A V G - 8 . 4 6 2
( 1 . 5 3 )
W i t h  c o m p e t i t i o n *  N E ,  e x c l .  A V G - - 6 . 1 0 9
( 1 . 7 0 ) *
D i s t a n c e  t o  n e a r e s t  c i t y  ( k m ) 0 . 0 3 0 0 . 0 6 4
( 1 . 0 6 ) ( 2 . 2 5 ) * *
P o p u l a t i o n  i n  c o m m u n i t y  1  ( 1 9 9 4 ;  1 0 0 0  i n h a b i t a n t s )  0 . 0 2 8 0 . 0 3 1
( 1 . 9 0 ) * ( 1 . 8 4 ) *
P o p u l a t i o n  i n  c o m m u n i t y  2  ( 1 9 9 4 ;  1 0 0 0  i n h a b i t a n t s ) - 0 . 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 1
( 0 . 0 5 ) ( 0 . 0 6 )
P o p .  i n  c o m m .  1  *  l e n g t h  ( / 1 0 0 ) - 0 . 0 2 5 - 0 . 0 2 2
( 1 . 7 2 ) * ( 1 . 2 3 )
E l e c t r i c i t y 1 . 7 6 9 - 1 . 9 2 7
( 1 . 0 3 ) ( 0 . 9 6 )
L e n g t h  ( k m ) - 0 . 0 1 7 - 0 . 0 1 2
( 0 . 7 3 ) ( 0 . 4 6 )
P o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h  i n  c o m m u n i t y  1 0 . 3 2 2 - 0 . 2 6 1
( 0 . 1 8 ) ( 1 . 2 1 )
P o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h  i n  c o m m u n i t y  2 0 . 1 2 2 0 . 4 3 5
( 0 . 8 2 ) ( 2 . 3 2 ) * *
A V G - 3 . 8 1 5
( 0 . 9 8 )
N E ,  n o t  A V G - 4 . 2 8 3
( 1 . 5 9 )
C o n s t a n t 1 . 3 9 6 - 0 . 4 7 3
( 0 . 6 6 ) ( 0 . 2 3 )
O b s e r v a t i o n s 7 1 7 1
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 2 9 0 . 4 3
N o t e s :
T a b l e  7 :  C o m p e t i t i o n  v s .  o w n e r s h i p
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e :  C h a n g e  i n  S e r v i c e  q u a l i t y  1 9 9 4  t o  2 0 0 4
A b s o l u t e  z - V a l u e  i n  p a r e n t h e s e  ( b a s e d  o n  r o b u s t  H u b e r - W h i t e  
s t a n d a r d  e r r o r s ) .  *  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  1 0 % ;  * *  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  5 % ;  * * *  
s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  1 % .  S e r v i c e  q u a l i t y  i s  t r a i n  k i l o m e t e r s  p e r  l i n e  
k i l o m e t e r s .
6 Summary
The preceding preliminary results of our study on competition for passenger railway
services suggest that there are positive eﬀects of competition for the market on
service quality. There are several reasons to criticize our approach. For instance,
one might argue that the lines in the control group are also subjected to some degree
of competition, because DB Regio might fear that uncooperative behavior induces
the agency to resort to competition in the future, or that it reduces its chances to
succeed on the competitive lines. However, this would suggest that our analysis
underestimates the eﬀects of competition.
We are presently extending the analysis to all other German states. Preliminary
results suggest that the competition eﬀects survive at reasonable levels of signif-
icance. However, in other ways, Baden-Württemberg is not representative. For
instance, in most other states, there seems to be a negative selection eﬀect: As ar-
gued by the competitors of DB Regio, the lines that are subjected to competition
are typically lemons, with much lower frequency of service, at least in 1994.
In addition, we are thinking of several other extensions. First, we would like
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to consider alternative quality measures. In particular, we shall try to supplement
our analysis at least partly with data on passenger kilometers. This would not only
be useful to improve the analysis of the eﬀects of competition on service quality; it
would also help to understand more about the relation between supply quality and
patronage. At the present, however, we are skeptical about data limitations. Second,
we would like to to use eﬃciency measures rather than pure output measures. From a
policy perspective, it would be interesting to use data on subsidies per line-kilometer.
It will be impossible to obtain data on the changes in subsidies at the required
geographical level. Nevertheless, some information on the eﬀects of competition can
be obtained by exploiting the relation between required subsidies and the extent of
competitive procurement at the state level.
7 Appendix
Coeff. M.E.
(z-Value)
Population in community 1 (1994; 1000 inhabitants) -0.001 -0.001
(0.59)
Population in community 2 (1994; 1000 inhabitants) -0.008 -0.003
(1.95)*
Pop. in comm. 1 * length (/100) -0.000 -0.000
(0.54)
Length (km) 0.008 0.003
(1.41)
Distance to nearest city (km) -0.016 -0.005
(1.71)*
Electricity 1.489 0.485
(3.19)***
Constant -0.618
(1.27)
Lines 71
log Likelihood -36.19
Notes:
Table A1: Determinants of Competition (Probit Analysis)
Dependent variable: With competition
Absolute z-Value in parenthese (based on robust Huber-White standard 
errors). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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